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NOTES
NLRB Settlement Agreements -Right of a
Charging Party to an Evidentiary Hearing
The Leeds & Northrup Company, manufacturer of electronic
equipment, filed unfair labor practice charges against the Leeds &
Northrup Employees Union, averring that during a plant strike the
union had violated the Labor Management Relations Act.1 After in-
vestigating the charges,' the Regional Direcor of the Fourth Region,
acting on behalf of the Board's General Counsel, filed a complaint
against the union alleging unfair labor practices within the meaning
of section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the NLRA.a This complaint was later
withdrawn by the Regional Director on the basis of an informal set-
tlement agreement between the union and himself.4 The company re-
fused to consent to this agreement and requested a hearing on its ob-
jections. This request was denied initially by the Regional Director and
later by the General Counsel on review.5 The company then brought
the case for review in the Third Circuit court of appeals, seeking to
have the ruling of the Regional Director and General Counsel set
aside. Held, reversed: Once a complaint has issued, a charging party
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on its objections to an informal
settlement agreement. Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527
(3d Cir. 1966).
I. NLRB PROCEDURE
The National Labor Relations Board was given the power by the
NLRA to prevent persons from engaging in any unfair labor practice
161 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1964). The original
act was called the National Labor Relations Act; the 1947 amendment, the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act. The statute in its present form will hereafter be referred to as the
NLRA.
The company charged the union with coercing its employees during the strike: by
threatening them with violence, loss of employment, and union fines if they crossed the
picket lines; by imposing fines against non-strikers prior to union trials; by applying dues
on account of fines to be imposed, as opposed to waiving dues for strikers; and by subse-
quently imposing fines equal in amount to the wages that were earned during the strike.
329 U.S.C. § 158 (1964):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157. ...
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ...
' The union agreed to the posting of notices at the plant which stated that the union
would not threaten employees with violence or loss of employment for failing to act con-
cordantly with the union in the future.
a The Regional Director, by letter of May 22, 1964, denied the relief sought and stated
that pursuant to NLRB rules and regulations § 102.19 the company was entitled to seek
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affecting interstate commerce.' The Board's regulations provide that
any person wishing to charge another person with engaging in an
unfair labor practice shall file a charge with the Regional Director
for the region in which the alleged unfair labor practice has oc-
curred The Regional Director acts on behalf of the Board's General
Counsel' in investigating the charge and determining whether or not
a complaint should issue.! If the Regional Director decides a complaint
should issue, the usual procedure results in service of the complaint
on the charged party,"0 an answer to the charge,1' a hearing,2 and the
trial examiner's decision which is filed with the Board."a If exceptions"'
are filed, the Board reviews the case and makes a final ruling;1 if not,
the decision automatically becomes the decision and order of the
Board. " Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board may ob-
tain review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia or in the court of appeals for the circuit where the alleged
unfair labor practice occurred.'
The Regional Director may withdraw a complaint on his own mo-
tion"8 by entering into either a formal or an informal settlement agree-
ment with the charged party. " The agreement stipulates that the
charged party agrees to take the affirmative action which the Board
might have ordered in a formal proceeding." A formal settlement
review of the action by filing a request for review with the General Counsel of the NLRB.
The company did this, but the General Counsel advised the company that he approved the
action of the Regional Director in executing the settlement agreement.
649 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
129 C.F.R. § 102.10 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations).
6 29 U.S.C. § 153 (d) (1964): "There shall be a General Counsel of the Board .... He
shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of investigation of charges and
issuance of complaints under section 160 of this title, and in respect of the prosecution of
such complaints before the Board."
'The Regional Director's decision on whether or not to issue a complaint is reviewable
by the General Counsel whose decision on the matter is final and unappealable. 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.19 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations). Once a complaint is issued the General
Counsel is responsible for prosecuting the matter.
"' The complaint states the unfair labor practice and contains a notice of a hearing before
a trial examiner designated by the Board. 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1965) (NLRB rules and
regulations).
1129 C.F.R. 5 102.20 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations).
1 29 C.F.R. 5 102.34 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations).
13 29 C.F.R. 5 102.45 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations).
1429 C.F.R. § 102.46 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations).
5 29 C.F.R. § 102.48 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations).
16 ibid.
'729 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964). See also American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB,
345 U.S. 100 (1953) and Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S.
261 (1940).
1829 C.F.R. § 102.18 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations).
"
9 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. N.L.R.B. 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1953); Shenandoah-
Davies Mining Co., 11 NLRB 885 (1939).




agreement results in the issuance of a final Board order and can be
enforced by a court decree. An informal settlement agreement is a
gentlemen's agreement, and no formal order or court decree issues.
The agreement itself is contingent on strict compliance by the accused
party. If there is no compliance with an informal settlement the
agreement is nullified, and the Regional Director proceeds as he nor-
mally would in prosecuting the complaint.
II. OBJECTIONS TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Since settlement agreements may give the charging party less than
it sought, it might object to withdrawal of the complaint and demand
an evidentiary hearing on its objections. On objections to formal set-
tlement agreements, section 10 (f) of the NLRA5 ' allows the charging
party to take the case to a circuit court of appeals for a decision on
whether a right to a hearing exists. The question of the charging par-
ty's right to a hearing on its objections to a formal settlement agree-
ment has been adjudicated with different results in the federal cir-
cuits.2 The problem was initially considered by the Third Circuit in
Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB.' The court ruled that after
a complaint issues on an unfair labor practice charge, if a settlement is
negotiated, a charging party is entitled to a hearing. Support for the
ruling was found in section 5 (b) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 4 enacted in 1946 for the purpose of regulating the procedure of
administrative agencies." Another reason given by the court was that
a hearing would create a record which would allow an intelligent re-
view of the propriety of the Board's action. Eight years later in Textile
2129 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1965):
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any
United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice
in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides
or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, by filing in such court a written petition praying that
the order of the Board be modified or set aside.
2 An analysis of the rights of the charging party before the Board is presented in Com-
ment, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 786 (1965). See also Recent Decision, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1104
(1965); Recent Decision, 26 U. PITT. L. REv. 642 (1965).
23 202 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
245 U.S.C. § 1004(b) (1964):
The agency shall afford all interested parties opportunity for (1) the sub-
mission and consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals
of adjustment where time, the nature of the proceeding and the public interest
permit, and (2) to the extent that the parties are unable so to determine any
controversy by consent, hearing, and decision upon notice and in conformity
with sections 1006 and 1007 of the title.
' The act regulates administrative agencies in four distinct ways: (1) by requiring that
public information be given; (2) by prescribing a procedure for administrative rule-making;
(3) by prescribing a procedure for administrative adjudication; (4) by regulating judicial
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Workers v. NLRB" the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
allowed the Board an alternative. The court held that a charging party
was entitled either to a hearing or to a statement of the Board's rea-
sons for supporting the formal settlement agreement-but not neces-
sarily to both."'
In 1964 the Second Circuit completely rejected the idea that a
charging party should have a right to an evidentiary hearing. In
Local 282, Teamsters Union v. NLRB' that court reasoned that a
charging party is not entitled to the procedural protection of the
APA. The court felt that in order to qualify under the APA, the
right sought to be enforced must be a private right;"9 and, since the
National Labor Relations Act enforces only public rights," the charg-
ing party could not qualify."' However, the issue of public versus
private rights was recently discussed in United Auto Workers v. Sco-
field," where the United States Supreme Court granted a charging
party the right of intervention at the appellate level. Classing this as
a private right, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, "In prior decisions,
this Court has observed that the Labor Act recognizes the existence
of private rights within the statutory scheme. These cases have, to be
sure, emphasized the 'public interest' factor. To employ the rhetoric
of 'public interest,' however, is not to imply that the public right ex-
cludes recognition of parochial private interests. '"" Mr. Chief Justice
Warren went on to say that the statutory pattern of the act does not
dichotomize "public" as opposed to "private" interest, but that the two
interblend in the intricate statutory scheme."
III. ANALYSIS OF LEEDS & NORTHRUP CO. v. NLRB
Initially the Third Circuit had to determine whether the rule of
Marine Eng'rs applied to an informal settlement agreement, i.e.,
whether the informality of the settlement agreement excluded the
court's jurisdiction under section 10 (f) of the NLRA. The union con-
review of administrative action. Brown, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 1947
Wis. L. REv. 66. The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act is set
forth in S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946).
2 2 9 4 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir. 1961), 315 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cif. 1963).27Id. at 741.
8 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964).
29 Id. at 799.
"°The court cited as authority Amalgamated Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309
U.S. 261, 264-65 (1940). For a further discussion of this subject by the Supreme Court in
a later decision see, Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 493 (1953).
"For a discussion of public and private rights see Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in
Labor Board Cases, 59 HARV. L. REv. 720 (1946).




tended that such discretionary actions of the Regional Director and
the General Counsel were not final Board orders and thus were not
reviewable. The company insisted that this would be improper because
choice of a certain form of agreement could foreclose judicial 'review.
The court ruled that informal agreements are reviewable under sec-
tion 10 (f) of the NLRA"5 and under section 10 (c) of the APA. " It
added that any distinction between formal and informal final dispo-
sition of the case confuses incidence with substance, and the actual
need for review rather than the formalities of Board procedure must
control. In explaining its position the court quoted from Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. United States:" "The ultimate test of review-
ability is not to be found in an overrefined technique, but in the need
of the review to protect from the irreparable injury threatened in the
exceptional case by administrative rulings.""8
The court stated that in dismissing a complaint, the Regional Direc-
tor acts on behalf of the Board and not on behalf of the General
Counsel. Once the complaint issues, the proceeding passes from the
investigatory stage to the adjudicative stage, and control changes
from the General Counsel to the Trial Examiner and the Board.
Therefore, the Regional Director's disposition of the complaint is as
final as direct action by the Board. While recognizing the valuable
function the Board serves in promoting expertise in the labor field
and unburdening the judiciary, the court refused to acknowledge that
Congress intended to give the Board power to foreclose judicial review
in this area. The court also cited section 3 (d) of the NLRA, ° which,
read in conjunction with section 101.9 of the Board's "a ,s
35 See note 21 supra.
30"Judicial Review of Agency Action. Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial
review or (2) action is by law committed to agency discretion." 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964):
(a) Right of Review
Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute,
shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.
(c) Acts Reviewable
Every agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to
judicial review. Any preliminary procedural or intermediate agency, action or
ruling not directly reviewable shall be subject to review of the final agency
action.
37316 U.S. 407 (1942).
8 id. at 425.
"' At this point the Regional Director must obtain the consent of the adjudicative officer
of the Board before he can withdraw, settle, or dismiss a complaint. General Maintenance
Eng'rs Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 295 (1963); United Aircraft Corp., 91 N.L.R.B. 215 (1958).
4o See note 8 supra.
41 C.F.R. § 101.9 (1965) (NLRB rules and regulations):
Settlement after issuance of complaint. . ..
(a) Even though formal proceedings have begun, the parties again have full
opportunity at every stage to dispose of the case by amicable adjustment and
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indicates that neither Congress nor the Board intended to vest in the
Regional Director and the General Counsel the power to settle com-
plaints after their issuance without the consent of all the parties.
Heavy reliance was placed on the Supreme Court's decision in Sco-
field,"' which recognized that a charging party has certain private as
well as public rights before the Board. There the Court had com-
mented that the issuance of a complaint formally recognizes the
charging party as a party to the action. It had added "if the Board
dismisses the complaint .... [a charging party] can obtain review as a
person aggrieved."4
Having determined that the Board could not arbitrarily impose an
informal settlement agreement, the Court ruled that any adjudicatory
phase of the administrative process necessitates appropriate avenues of
review, both administrative and judicial." Therefore, a charging party
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, in accordance with the scheme
contemplated by the NLRA and APA. This evidentiary hearing is a
necessary part of the appropriate avenue of administrative review
which was set up by the procedure of the Board." The Court felt that
there must be more than a mere consideration of the charging party's
objections' as contended by the Board. Moreover, once the adminis-
trative remedies, which include an evidentiary hearing, are exhausted
by the complaining charging party then the matter can be taken to
the appellate court for judicial review of the settlement agreement.
The evidentiary hearing allows a reviewing court to consider intelli-
gently the contentions of the parties through the hearing record and
thus satisfies the requirement of an appropriate avenue of judicial
review.
IV. CONCLUSION
Leeds & Northrup indicates the trend in present decisions toward a
presumption of reviewability." Since the presumption was not re-
butted by a showing of legislative intent to preclude review or by a
in compliance with the law. Thus, after the complaint has been issued and a
hearing scheduled or even begun, the attorney in charge of the case and the
regional director afford all parties every opportunity for the submission and
consideration of facts, arguments, offers of settlement, or proposals of adjust-
ment, except where time, the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest
do not permit.
42382 U.S. 205 (1965).
4"Id. at 219 (1965).
44 357 F.2d at 535.
41 See note 41 supra.
46357 F.2d at 536.
4 United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1949); Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
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